Despite its radical re-conceptions of history, subjectivity, thought, time and language, Heidegger's Beiträge 1 is, above all, a provisional book. While Heidegger seeks and directs the reader toward a new thought ofBeing, or rather an 'enthinking (Erdenken)' of Seyn not grounded in the metaphysics of presence, at no point does he offer an example of or model for it. Rather, he elucidates the preparatory path through which an opening for such thinking, completely free from the metaphysical tradition, can be cleared. As Heidegger puts it, in order to open up thinking to "an other beginning, philosophy has to have achieved one crucial thing: projecting-open, i.e., the grounding enopening of the free play ofthe time-space ofthe truth ofbe-ing (Seyn)" (4/5).
tially prevents an other beginning for thinking; not just because the will and effort for it are lacking (although in general they are), but because it makes the experience of beings requisite to such thinking in1possible. Thus, a clearing for an other thinking can only be opened if it also inaugurates "the beginning of another history" (8/10) for human experience. 2 Accordingly, Heidegger's provisional project must reveal the specific conditions necessary for the preparatory clearing that liberates our experience of beings from our current worldview, such that we can become "able to experience [beings] in a fundamental way" (9/11), or at least to project-open the preparatory clearing for such an experience, should it be possible.
In what follows, I detail both the Beiträge's account of the origin, historical development, and domination of the Western experiential worldview as weIl as the pathway towards the liberation of human experience indicated within it. I will exclusively focus on the historical development of our modes of experience in Heidegger's account. My goal is to bring to light the experiential, rather than the more frequently treated poetic or thoughtful, changes that our entire culture (rather than simply the few and rare who seek it) must undergo to project-open a clearing for an other beginning. My account will proceed in two parts: The first details the historical development of our subjective experience of beings, leading up to its current arrangement within the modem worldview, which for Heidegger is essentially determined by technological science. 3 The second stage grapples with the pathway out of our technological mode of experience into a more primordial one. Although each of the stages within this trajectory are defined as experiences of beings, Heidegger articulates them as drastically different from each other; so different, in fact, that the tenninology he employs to express them changes from stage to stage. Much of Heidegger's account depends on the distinctions between (and within) two German words for experiencing: erfahren and erleben. Roughly speaking, experience shifts from erfahren to erleben in the first part, and then back again in the second, although as we shall see the words subtly alter their meaning throughout their trajectory.
I From erfahren to erleben: As noted above, Heidegger contends that the modem worldview is dominated by technological science. Thus, to understand our worldview we must grasp the development of modem science by retraversing the "sequence of steps of 'experiencing' ['Erfarhens']" (110/160) from which it arose. Our worldview, then, arises from the history of human experience conceived as erfahren.
Heidegger begins this sequence by placing erfahren between quotation marks (110/160), which might be intended to indicate the distance of this experience from the don1inant connotation of erfahren, Le., to find out or leam. As the inaugural experience in the development of our worldview, this "erfahren" must be the most basic and un-interpreted of all possible experiences of entities or it must be the merely receptive, non-interpretive experiencing of that which we "come upon" only insofar as it "pushes against" [stossen] us (111/161, tr. modified). This is a bare affective encounter in which son1ething imposes itself upon us such that we "must take it in" just as it imposes itself (111/161). Beings, here, cannot be experienced other than in the way in which they push against us, and each push is singularly specific to the being pushing and, moreover, to the specific experience of it taken in. These experiences, then, are not grounded in any presupposed or determinate interpretation of beings or their Being, but are always, with every fresh push, new and estranging. 4 Insofar as beings estrange us, however, we are not simply swept up in what we come across, but react to the objects we encounter with a certain wonder or curiosity about what it is that we are experiencing. In Heidegger's terms, "erfahren" gives way to er-fahren, minus the quotation marks and with a hyphen after its prefix (110/160).5 The hyphen indicates that our passive, estranging experience develops necessarily into an active, curious one in which our encounters both enable us, and compel us, to respond out of interest and wonder by approaching the entities that push against USo Having received the push of that which comes upon us, we are correspondingly stimulated or carried over to primitive inquiry, or to "er-fahren as going up to something [Zugehen auf etwas] " that affects us (111/160). Pushed against by beings, we react by seeking to experience them as they are. Estrangement both enables and compels us to approach and explore the singular existence of each encountered entity. This inquiring approach (i.e., er-.fahren), however, is only enabled (i.e., er-fahren) by the fact that estranging beings push us into it. Thus, this experience is still not guided by any particular interpretation of beings, but is limited simply to exploring "how [any encountered entity] looks and whether it is extant at all and approachable" (111/160). In short, we seek to experience entities as they show themselves in our experience.
Nevertheless, er-fahren does mark the dawn of human understanding and interpretation, for the very exploration of entities (even in terms, e.g., of their presence or non-presence, approachability or non-approachability, etc.) presupposes some standard according to which our experiences can be determined as experiences of entities. In other words, the attempt to explore our experiences of entities presupposes criteria that are "always already somehow sought" (111/160) within the entities being explored. Each experience, through the "changing conditions of its encountering and coming forth" (111/160) gives us standards to expect in experience (e.g., an entity that affects us with its colour gives us a standard for seeking not only repeated encounters with that entity as so coloured, but that colour as an affect, and colour more gel1erally, etc.). As such, our exploratory approach leads to the further determination of experience (still, however, as er-fahren) as the "testing [Erprobung] " (111/160) of beings in accordance with presupposed standards of experience. We now seek to find, within each new experience, the (previously experienced) standards that make things what they are (approachable presence, detenninate qualities, demarcations of quantity, etc.). Thus, within our testing "what is sought after is always more or less something definite" (112/161) that can be judged according to the criteria developed from past experiences, which (so we presuppose) "can be found again and expected" (111/160) in every 'real' experience. This observation may then be-and, in fact, is compelled by our very testing to be-developed further and extended by new methods and instruments of observation (magnifying glasses, microscopes, iterable conditions, etc.) that intervene within entities to make them more rigorously comparable to our standards. In so doing, we "provide ourselves with determinate experiences [bestimmte Erfahrungen] [through] the application of determinate conditions ofmore exact seeing and determining" (111/160, tr. modified).
Out of this trajectory of progressively more determinate Erfahrungen, then, we unconsciously but necessarily develop an interpretation of beings and their Being in terms of their approachable presence and availability for determinate testing in accordance with the conditions of determinate experience. Experience, then, has shifted from estrangement by unique, pushing beings to the concrete 'learning' or 'finding out about, them by inquiring into them through determinate experiential standards. As such, "experiencing [Das Erfahren] focuses in advance on working out a regularity [i.e.,] grasping ahead to what has the character of a rule and that means: to what constantly returns under the same conditions" (111/161). By applying pre-set criteria to beings, we detennine in advance the general nLles according to which detenninate experience of any being whatsoever is possible (e.g., allowing repeated observation through their stable presence, being empirically observable in their essential properties, meeting expectations within iterable conditions, etc.). From uniquely individual estrangement, then, we have moved to experiences which, in principle, could be had equally by anyone, of any being.
These general criteria are those that any experiencing subject can and would develop, as they arise directly from estrangement itself. As such, they constitute the public and universal standards for the experience of any being, or the standards of objectivity, and it is not accidental, but necessary, that these standards arise. Objective experience, then, is capable of becoming a worldview precisely because it articulates general conditions for determinate experience of any being that are valid for and graspable by any and all experiencing human beings. Objectivity, thus, becomes the cultural worldview according to which our experience of beings (and the interpretation of their Being) is universally and univocally regulated. This worldview determines beings univocally as objectively experienced and experience-able by everyone in accordance with public and objective standards.
Within this worldview, all possible experiences of beings-or, more precisely, of objects-are predictable, for we now determine experience of beings "in such a way that generally the rule and only this detennines in advance what is objective in its domain and that the domain is not graspable in any other way than by working out rules, and this only by den10nstrating regularity [... ] in such a way that the rule is the rule for the regulation of measure and for possible measurability (space, time)" (112/162). Beings are preconceived, or 'fore-grasped' according to objective criteria, and all beings are equally subsumed under these criteria. 6 Objectivity, then, is "a grasping ahead to [the] merely quantitatively and regulationally [quantitativ-regelhaft] determined don1ain ofthe object" (112/162). 7 The modem worldview is made possible, then, only insofar as human experience has, in fact, cut itself off from anything resembling "erfahren", or even er-fahren. In other words, the experience requisite for modem science is not empirical, ifby en1pirical we mean testified to by direct "experiencing [Erfahren] Through this fore-grasping, we re-present [vor-stellen] objects to ourselves, "in the sense of a grasping that reaches ahead, plans and arranges everything [...] this re-presentation recognizes no limit in [its grasp of] the given,
and wants to find no limit (94-5/135-6)." The laws of this re-presentation (most prominently the law of causality)8 allow us not only to detem1ine with precision and exactness the current objective world; they give us the power to reach ahead and grasp all of the objects we have yet to encounter, even those that we could never encounter (the experience of others, possible worlds, theoretical origins of the universe, etc.). New experiences, then, are merely the working out or enactment of calculable predictions from other experiences.
Thus, a being is not an individually experienced content, but a determinate consequence or cause that is predictable through the nLles of objectivity. An object is 'made' by predictable forces and, as such, can be re-made by simply working out and employing the same forces. Modem science thoroughly replaces the mystery of unique singularities with "the domination of making and what is made" (92/131). In other words, our worldview is technological. In the Beiträge, Heidegger calls this technological worldview "machination [Machenshaft]" (92/131). Under machination, there is no longer any need to question the Being of beings, because all objects are subsumed under the univocal interpretation of objectivity, even before their appearance. In this worldview, "only what man is able to bring to and before hirnself can count as 'a being'" (90/129).
Because all of the beings that we can and do experience are already and univocally fore-grasped through objective re-presentation, our technological interpretation of beings and their Being recedes from view as an interpretation, making the age of machination also "the epoch 01 the total lack 01 questioning" (76/108) regarding beings and their Being. The cost ofthis unlimited fore-grasping of beings, then, is the loss of any experience of beings that is not already calculated by machination. Every experience we have is, in its essential aspects, the same, as every being is always already understandable in terms ofunivocal, universal and well-known laws.
The technological world, in other words, is boring, for there is nothing within it that can surprise us any longer. The world is merely a set of details to be calculated, like inputs in a ledger, and has lost all awe for experiencing human beings. This loss, coupled with the silent residue that resides within us of estrangement (as the faint memory ofthe wonder of earlier experiences) leads, Heidegger claims, to a kind of sentimental yeaming for a more wondrous experience of beings. Under machination, we are consequently "driven by the anxiety of boredom" (85/121) to seek novel, estranging experiences. Under machination, however, beings can no longer push against us in estranging encounters. Our worldview objectively fore-grasps all possible experiences, and because machination conceals itself as an interpretation, we cannot and do not raise questions about beings outside of it. If we cannot find all estranging encounter with beings outside of nlachination, then we can only seek for new experiences within it. This yeaming arises specifically as a lack of satisfaction with human experience as it is lived within machination; it is also the restless desire to make technological life less predictable. How, then, can our technological experience beconle more estranging?
Recall that under machination there is no possible experience that could not be had by anyone (e.g., ifl want to experience Cuban life, an I have to do is get on a plane; if I want to experience cosmic events, all I have to do is look through a telescope or at a computer model, etc.). This means that my experience is not limited to any specific encounters; on the contrary, it consists of the seemingly limitless field of an possible technological experiences. Heidegger calls the individual experience of machinational objects livedexperience [Erlebnis] and refers to this mode of experience with the verb erleben. 9 Machination calculates the making of an beings, thus creating possible lived-experiences that could be had by anyone and everyone.
However, while all objects within machination are calculable in advance, for each individual hunlan the first experiences one has of these objects are fresh and new. Objectivity makes the 'new' experience of a near infinity of objects available to everyone through its technological control of beings. In such experiences, of course, beings no longer push upon us as estranging, encounter-specific beings; what we come across, instead, are calculable objects as uniquely experienced by individuals. Thus, erleben does not denote the estranging experience brought about by a unique being, but the novel experience one has with things that are objectively open to all. By exploiting the possibilities for novel individual experiences made possible by universal objectivity, all can have new Erlebnisse that relieve the boredom caused by the essential predictability of technological objects (e.g., when I first board a plane, it is a fascinating experience for me, although not for experienced flyers; when I first see an eclipse it is mystifying, although not for experienced astronomers).
While technology makes lived-experiences available to individuals, it also takes the wonder out of them precisely through the calculation that make the new experience open to all. Our boredom is not relieved by any particular lived-experience, for each can only be lived insofar as it is not wondrous and estranging, but is necessarily calculable and predictable. As a result, we yeam again for new lived-experiences that break the newly-produced tedium. Of course, the more lived-experiences we have, the more experiences within the /technological world becon1e un-estranging for us and, therefore, the more diflficult it becomes to satisfy our quest for something new. As we experience fmore and more of what our fore-grasped world has to offer, the novelty within it will start to ron dry and we will want to experience more and more of what there is to be had (e.g., if we have already ridden in planes, we may want to ride faster planes that arrive in half the time or planes that fly beyond the atmosphere; if we have seen eclipses, we may demand to see more intense ones, or forge fantastic versions of them using virtual imaging technology, etc.). If we are to achieve any manner of (even short-lived) satisfaction, our new livedexperiences must become proportionally more difficult to calculate. The very nature of erleben, in other words, demands that the world progressively turn "into a larger, more unprecedented, more screaming 'Erlebnis'" (77/109).10 As such, the desire for individual Erlebnisse is not opposed to the expansion of machination; rather, machination both satisfies (by providing new livedexperiences) and re-invigorates (by making them immediately boring) our yearning for them. Erleben and machination, then, are essentially intertwined and "mutually drive each other into the extreme" (93/133).11
In sum, with novel Erlebnisse we have (temporary) wonder and, yet, need never (and can never) call beings or their Being into question. Erleben results from a worldview that has forgotten its experiential (i.e., erfahren) origins, being content with the mere progression/extension of the always already calculated through the momentarily novel. Under machination and Erlebnisse, then, we necessarily fail to recognize that other experiences of beings may be possible; by contrast, in tracing the historical sequence from erfahren to erleben, Heidegger seeks to reveal their essential possibility. In reminding us of the origins of machination and erleben, Heidegger aims to open our experience up once again to the estrangement of beings, creating the possibility of an other thinking of beings and their Being; one more primordial than that possible within our self-concealing worldview. This opening for an other experience of beings is the clearing as projecting-open for which the Beiträge is the preparation.
Heidegger's critical history of n1achination and erleben, however, is not sufficient to accomplish this clearing, for we still can have no experience of beings outside of machination. On Heidegger's account, even if we were to ask whether or not such beings could be experienced otherwise, we could never so experience them, because all human experience is under the domination of machination, which conceals itself as an interpretation. Thus, it is not enough to question in thought or memory whether or not the objects of our ex-perience could be thought otherwise (i.e., simply contemplate the possibility, as though the question of beings and their Being were a n1ere thought experiment). Rather, we must experience the fact that technological experience arises from only one interpretation of their Being.
12
By experiencing our n1etaphysical worldview as an imposition upon beings, we may reveal an experience of beings outside of objectivity (i.e., we may decisively project-open the clearing within which an experiment with thinking about beings and their Being can occur). Somehow we (i.e., the whole culture of our worldview, not just individual thinkers, poets or artists) must experience our worldview as the dominant, concealed, unquestioning interpretation that it iso In the second part, I will describe this movement from machination and erleben back to a more primordial Erfahren ofbeings.
11 From erleben to erfahren: To reiterate, the remembrance of the experiential origin of machination and lived-experience alone cannot overcome the technological worldview within which beings exist for us as calculable. Moreover, even if we could return to our initial experience (in the sense of "erfahren") of entities, this would not allow us to escape our worldview, for we have seen that machination is grounded in the unique push of estranging beings. If all experiences with beings hitherto lead only to machination, upon what can we found an overcoming of our worldview?
The only aspect of beings left outside of technological experience is their coming-to-be, or what Heidegger calls their Seyn (Be-ing). The Seyn of beings is the event (Ereignis) of their coming-to-be. What machination essentially covers over is the fact that beings do not originate with our technological calculations (for it considers them only in terms of their make-ability once existent), but originally come-to-be in an event that gives them over to our experience. Beings come-to-be through Seyn, "wherein all beings must orignarily arise and appear strange" (78/111) and by definition the Seyn of beings is concealed within machination.
As such, Seyn does not ensure that we will interpret beings in accordance with their coming-to-be. The fact of n1achination demonstrates that beings come-to-be such that they are interpreted without consideration for their Seyn. Seyn brings about beings such that their coming-to-be can be and is covered over by the technological worldview. Thus, Seyn can be defined as the "[a]bandonment of Being: [which n1eans] that Seyn abandons beings and leaves beings to themselves and thus lets beings become objects of machination (78/111, tr. modified)." Beings come-to-be as abandoned to have their Seyn concealed by machination. So, if an experience beings outside of our worldview remains possible, it must occur in accordance with their Seyn (for this is all that remains of them beyond machination), but Seyn essentially abandons beings to machination's self-concealment. As such, to experience beings within machination in terms of their Seyn would be to experience them as abandoned. It is this experience that must be enacted if we are to project open the clearing for "shifting man into the basic relations with beings" (9/12) requisite for an other beginning. What might such an experience look like?
Experiencing beings as abandoned would be to experience them as in some way needy or impoverished, because they are cut off from their Seyn, which alone can preserve them as they are in their coming-to-be in the face of ever-increasing technological control. Moreover, it would be to experience this impoverishment and need for preservation as a crisis or distress within beings, i.e., to experience calculable objects, due to their grounding in something olltside of machination, as endangered by machination. Above all, it would be to experience this impoverishment and need as a necessary crisis, in that it arises from the coming-to-be of beings. 13 As such, it would be the experience of what Heidegger calls Not, or the necessary distress/need of the impoverishment ofb'eings (79/112).14 The glaring and seemingly intractable problem, then, is how to experience objects as abandoned, since machination conceals itself as an interpretation, thus concealing the abandonment of beings. We must recall that it is not enough to think that such an experience is possible, because it is our experiential worldview in general that must be overcome, and within it "[e]ven the will to [project-open the clearing for the other beginning] gets no hearing as long as the truth of Seyn and its uniqueness has not yet become Not" (9/12). In other words, we cannot individually will ourselves out of our clrrrent mode of experience into a more originary one as though it was an arbitrary choice or mere subjective habit. The technological worldview dominates beings and places them in need and crisis, and any of the other historicalor subjective options that seem to be available to us for founding alternate interpretations of then1 are simply stages on the path back to erleben. We cannot simply meditate anew on objects, undertake renewed testing of things to see what may be found, or try to grasp entities out of earlier or more remote paradigms of beings, etc., for " [m] ere modifications of what we now have do not get us underway, even if they happened with the greatest possible mixture of historically known ways ofthinking" (4/5).15 How, then, can the experience of Not possibly be effectuated?
If there is no outside to technological experience (or those that lead to it), then the only aspect of the abandonment of beings that can be experienced within it is the concealing ofdistress/need itself. The only experience of abandonment available to us is the "lack of necessary distress/need [Notlosigkeit]" (87/125, tr. modified) or the impossibility of recognizing the impoverished abandonment that defines n1achination. Our freedom from distress is, in fact, the very distress that must be experienced, for it is precisely n1achination's complete and controlling concealn1ent of Seyn that is the necessary impoverishment to which beings are abandoned. The problem is not, then, how to experience the abandonment of being, for we experience nothing but this abandonment; rather, the problem is how to experience the lack of distress that is our experience as distress. Heidegger's answer to this is somewhat elusive and is, unfortunately, only hinted at in the text, but it nonetheless can be deduced from the preceding. Machination conceals the abandonment of beings by Seyn by imposing objective standards and controls on them, thereby producing an incessant demand for ever more extravagant Erlebnisse. In order to experience the lack of distress as distress, then, we must somehow draw out of machination the Erlebnisse available within it that bring to light both the imposition that our worldview is upon beings, and the coming-to-be of beings prior to erleben. In other words, we can only become aware of the distress of the lack of distress by being "brought nearer [to Not] by being mindful ofthe darkening [... ] and the destruction" (83/119) taking place within machination through our accelerated demand for larger, more unprecedented lived-experiences. We are to take this reference to darkening and destruction, it would seem, quite literally. Because we are 'at-horne' within the calculating control of beings, we can never become aware of the imposition of our worldview on beings through either the more predictable or the more 'enchanting' yet still calculable lived-experiences made available within our worldview. Within such control, beings do not seem impoverished or needful, let alone in crisis, but appear as full, complete beings. Thus, we can only be made mindful of beings as impoverished and in crisis insofar as we experience the effects of machination on beings that are not calculable, i.e., that exceed our prediction and contro!. 111 other words, we can only come to an awareness of our lack of distress as distress if, precisely as and within the technological experience of beings defining of our epoch, "something unusual Ithe extreme until it is no longer calculable-not just novel, but genuinely beyond our capacity to devise or control it-thus pushing an encounter with beings outside of such control upon us once again. It is only when technological objects are experienced as beyond our calculation and control that the possibility of an experience ofbeings outside of our worldview can be opened up.
If we are to open up the possibility of such an experience, machination and erleben should not simply be (precisely because, from within, they cannot be) questioned, challenged, or modified; rather, we must drive them to the extreme point at which our relationship to beings ceases to be calculable and controllable. We can only experience beings outside of machination when their abandonment by Seyn to machination becomes so complete, making our drive for lived-experiences so excessive that it becomes impossible to control our technology. Only then do we experience (in retrospect) the concealment of Seyn's abandonment. 17 Only this "greatest occurrence [...] can still save us from being lost in the bustle of mere events and machinations" (41/58). Our worldview can only be truly overcome when technology reveals itself as "a power which man hirnself does not control," and it is the task of those who seek another beginning to use all available means to "help [humanity achieve] this realization.,,18
Conclusion: The experience of excessive, uncontrollable machination is necessary because our technological "direction of inquiry [... ] must be given up completely" (31/45, emphasis added), (not individually, but historically and decisively) because it so thoroughly "constricts and thwarts genuine experience [Erfahrung]" (26/37) of beings in tenns of their Seyn. In order to open experience up to something more originary and genuine, we must overcome both the trajectory of scientific er-fahren and the technological Erlebenisse to which it leads by destroying the worldview-and thus the world-within which they rage. Only then can "the deep stillness come over the world" (25/34) that projects-open the clearing for an other experience of beings. Thus, overcoming metaphysics means overcoming our experiential worldview from within.
This, then, is the cost of following Heidegger's path to project-open a clearing for an other beginning. While it is true that the Beiträge details many ways of seeking this other beginning (e.g., thinking, artistic and poetic creation, being-towards-death, etc.), in order to actually open a genuine clearing for it we would above all need to overcome machination completely and decisively; we "calillot turn away fron1 this destiny, namely to prepare the timespace for the final [emphasis added] decision concerning whether and how we experience [erfahren] and ground" (10/13) beings in their Seyn. 19 This "decision [will be] made when the necessity of the utmost mandate from within the innermost distress of abandonment of being is experienced and empowered into unendurable [emphasis added] power" (66/96). Thus, thinkers, artists and poets, despite their best efforts and will, can never get a hearing within our worldview and, therefore, will never clear a still space for thinking untilthrough machination itself-"all beings are sacrificed to Seyn" (163/230)20 such that we are once again forced "to face that a being is, whereas before a being was for [us] just a [for-grasped, calculable] being" (11/15). Only the strange fact of beings prior to our interpretation and control of them can ground, a new experience outside of machination and, with it, a new thinking.
Of course, we have faced this fact before. Such estranging, uninterpreted beings are what began leading us down the path to machination. Even the achieved overcoming of the technological worldview, then, does not guarantee an other experience ofbeings. Indeed, nothing within the history of our experience indicates that an other beginning is possible. The grounding of experience in Seyn is not a result of the clearing; rather, the clearing is simply the preparation requisite for the possibility of such an experience. If there is to be such an experience, it can only be determined by the n1anner in which Seyn brings them into being. In other words, in projecting open apreparatory clearing for an other beginning, we simply make it possible for a re-grounding of being to take place, should Seyn so ground them. There is no guarantee that experience will not simply repeat the history of Seyn's abandonment. This is why this preparation is a risk or 'leap' into the abyss.2l
For Heidegger, of course, the possible benefits ofthe risk far outweigh the actual costs, because he holds it as be our essential task "to restore beings from within the truth ofSeyn" (8/11). Ifbeings must be saved from technology and can only be so saved by being grounded again in their Seyn, the preparation for this is, indeed, "the one and only and thus singular goal of Ollr history" (13/17), i.e., "not to eliminate [... ] distress/need but rather [to] persevere in it [and] nlake it the ground of man's history" (32/45, tr. modified). While this leap may give the rest ofus "the impression ofbeing most reckless" (161/228), Heidegger holds that it is in fact the necessary task of our experience because "all beings are only [emphasis added] for the sake of Seyn" (163/230).
It is precisely on this point, I contend, that the Beiträge's path nlust be abandoned. Heidegger is certainly correct to draw our attention to the constrictive and destructive aspects ofthe technological worldview, and in particular to emphasize its grounding in an unquestionable and univocal interpretation of all beings. His call to overcome this interpretation, however, sacrifices all beings to the equally unquestionable (because by definition self-concealing and unknown) and univocal interpretation of beings through Seyn. In other words, Heidegger presents us with two equally univocal alternatives: the allpervasive machination of the technological worldview or the leap into the abyss of Seyn's essential grounding of all beings. Neither, however, reflects the nature of our experience of beings as Heidegger hirnself explicates it. Experience, as we have seen, is a relation to beings that is essentially unsatisfied with any single interpretation or experience. Experience, in other words, is the essential drive for new and varied relations to beings.
Heidegger is certainly correct to argue that this drive cannot be satisfied with the complete and univocal domination of technology and Erlebnis, which will, therefore, ultimately lead to our own destruction. But, he is nonetheless wrong to assurne that it must, or even ca11, solely ground itself in the interpretation ofbeings in terms oftheir Seyn. Experience, as Heidegger hirnself has shown, is the self-developing transgression of our interpretations of and relations to beings. We cannot simply 'leap' in the hopes of finding 'the' genuine relation to beings, for the essential truth of experience is that no single relation with or interpretation ofbeings can be taken as final or authentic. Experi-enee is just that whieh pushes beyond its own boundaries to new experienees and interpretations, and it is within experienee that we must seek salvation from the destruetive subsumption of beings under any univoeal interpretation. If we are to avoid the potentially disastrous eonsequenees of our monolithie teehnologieal worldview, we must steer equally elear ofthe temptations of any and all promises of an authentie, final grounding of experienee in any one interpretation. In other words, we must embraee experienee as that whieh seeks, ereates and transgresses its own interpretive frameworks in and as its ineessant explorations of beings; we must also strive to preserve the varied interpretations of beings that develop through our experienee. Beings ean only be saved from teehnologieal destruetion if we forsake all univocal interpretations of beings, affirming the multiplieity of both beings and interpretive frameworks already present, and, yet, nünously ignored, within experienee. 
